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NARRATIVE LIES AND COGNITIVE LOAD 1 
 
Lying is assumed to increase cognitive load, and it has been shown to slow response times to 
simple questions. We employed a dual-task methodology, the Detection Response Task 
(DRT), to assess cognitive load in telling narrative lies in a live, open-question interview. The 
DRT requires participants to press a button in response to a tactile stimulus every 3-5 seconds 
while simultaneously performing a primary task; in this case recounting either truthful or 
deceitful narratives. We found weak support for slowing in the time to initiate a narrative 
response when lying. In contrast, we found strong support for an increase in cognitive load 
when producing a narrative lie, as measured by both slowed DRT responses and increased 
response omissions, although this effect decreased with time on task. We advocate dual-task 
methodologies such as the DRT for increasing understanding of the assumptions made by 
theories of deception, and for refining lie-detection techniques. 
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People engage in deceptive behaviours on a daily basis, from inconsequential white 
lies to high-stakes acts of dishonesty (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). 
Typically, studies of lying have focused on their detection; here we have a more theoretical 
focus, on the relationship between deception and cognitive load. Deception is thought to 
increase cognitive load because it requires hiding emotional responses (Ekman & Frisen, 
1969), formulating lies that are both internally consistent and consistent with what the 
recipient already knows (Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981), watching for signs of 
suspicion in the recipient (Buller & Burgoon, 1996), and in general engaging in impression 
management (DePaulo et al., 2003). Lying is also thought to require cognitive control, 
because it is subject to Stroop-like interference from a prepotent honest response (Pennebaker 
& Chew, 1985). Consistent with these effects, subjective reports indicate lying is harder than 
telling the truth (Caso, Gnisci, Vrij, & Mann, 2005). 
Walczyk, Harris, Duck and Mulay’s (2014) Activation-Decision-Construction-Action 
theory (ADCAT) provides a detailed characterization of the cognitive processes involved in 
lying that implicates a number of loci for increased cognitive load. In ADCAT, the activation 
phase involves retrieval of the truth from long term memory. The decision involves central 
executive functions weighing up the consequences through a cost-benefit and likelihood 
analysis. During construction a plausible narrative is produced while conflicting details are 
inhibited. The action phase involves delivering the lie while monitoring the receiver for signs 
of disbelief and suppressing interference from the truth. These phases occur simultaneously, 
and all increase the time required to initiate a response. 
Suchotzki et al. (2017) found response time (RT) to be a reliable measure of the 
increased cognitive load associated with deception in a meta-analysis of 73 studies, with a 
large effect size (d = 1.26). However, RT has traditionally only been tested with simple 
binary responses in tasks such as the Concealed Information Test (Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, 
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& Mosmann, 2000), and the Sheffield Lie Test (Spence et al., 2001), or occasionally with a 
mixture of binary and one- or two-word responses, such as in the Time Restricted Integrity 
Confirmation test (Walczyk et al. 2005). These tasks involve responding to an audio 
recording via a computer, but deception often occurs within a social context where it is 
blended with truth in the production of narratives (McCornack, Morrison, Paik, Wisner & 
Zhu, 2014). 
Here we examine RT in the production of narrative lies. Our participants viewed short 
films and recounted the content to an interviewer (in either a ‘lie’ or ‘truth’ condition). A cue 
presented before each video indicated if their recounting should be truthful or untruthful. If 
narrative lie responses require additional cognitive load, verbal RT (i.e., the delay between 
the end of the interviewer’s question and the onset of the participant’s response) should be 
longer in the lie than truth condition. This assertion underpins our first hypothesis pre-
registered on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/jt5pg/)1. We also employed a live 
interview rather than computer-presented questions in order to induce the cognitive load 
associated with impression management. We also told the participants that they would have 
to recall some details of their answers at the end in order to capture the extra cognitive load 
occurring in real-world situations; lies must be sufficiently memorable so that reporting 
remains consistent over repeated interrogations. 
  We took advantage of the temporally extended nature of our experiment to not only 
measure cognitive workload during the action stage (i.e., when producing a narrative) but 
also, for the first time to or knowledge, during the construction stage (i.e., when viewing the 
video). To do so we use a dual-task methodology, the Detection Response Task (DRT), 
                                                 
1 In addition, we pre-registered additional hypotheses that have not yet been tested. The 
project for this research can be found at https://osf.io/jt5pg/. Data files for DRT and Vocal 
RT, an RStudio project to reproduce all analyses and figures, and, movie URLs, are publicly 
available through the above link.  
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which requires participants to press a button in response to an easily-perceived tactile 
stimulus that occurs every 3-5 seconds. The DRT has been adopted by the International 
Standards Organization as a measure of distracted driving (ISO 2016). Central to dual task 
methodologies is the notion that attentional resources are limited. If the primary task – in this 
case, lying - requires more attentional resources than are available, then performance on the 
secondary task – in this case the DRT – is hindered by having fewer resources to call on. The 
performance in the secondary task can then be used to determine the level of resources the 
primary task requires.  
Slowed DRT responses and response omissions have been found to provide sensitive 
measures of the cognitive load associated with a range of cognitive processes that are likely 
to be involved in narrative deception, including decision making, sustaining information in 
working memory, overcoming habitual actions, and holding a conversation (Strayer et al., 
2015; Tillman, Strayer, Eidels, & Heathcote, 2017). Based on the assumption that 
constructing and recounting lies increases cognitive load, our second and third pre-registered 
hypotheses are that DRT RT and omission rates will be higher in the lie than truth condition. 
Our design enabled us to collect an average of over 800 DRT trials per person, greater than 
the minimum of 20 verbal RTs recommended by Suchotzki et al. (2017) who note that 
previous deception RT studies have been limited by very few RT measurements.  
Method 
Participants 
Sample size was determined by specifying a fixed period of time for data collection 
(ending the second week of August with 44 participants). Participants were first year 
Psychology students (29 females) aged 18-66 (M = 27.1 years, SD = 10.6) who were given 
course credit for participation.  
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Materials 
The DRT device conformed to ISO standard ISO DIS 17488 (ISO, 2016), using a 
tactile stimulus delivered by a 10mm diameter 5 volt vibrating motor running at 11000 RPM 
and housed in a 3D-printed casing (14mm x 7mm). The housing was attached to the 
participant’s clavicle with tape and vibrated at random intervals ranging from 3-5 seconds 
with uniform probability. Participants responded to the vibrations with a button (a 6mm metal 
tactile ball) housed in a 16mm square 3D printed housing which was strapped to the index 
finger of their dominant hand with a Velcro strap. The stimulus and response devices were 
connected to an Arduino Nano 3.0 compatible microcontroller running custom software 
which interfaced via serial-over-USB to the experiment application. Timing was millisecond 
accurate. 
The Arduino-based software started and stopped the DRT protocol and reported 
events and timing information back to the PC experiment software. The software played, in 
random order, 26, one-minute long YouTube videos that were submitted as entries to 60 
second film competitions (URLs available at https://osf.io/jt5pg/). All videos had a coherent 
story and were screened for explicit content. The experiment software was developed as a 
C#/WPF .NET application and ran on a Windows 10 PC with a 1920x1080 24" monitor. The 
movies ran full-screen. 
The DRT RTs were time-locked to the trials by referencing the computer clock 
readings for each DRT response saved in the DRT data file. Verbal RTs were coded using 
sound files in Adobe Audition (Adobe Systems 2018, version 11.1.1.3). By examining the 
waveforms for each trial, verbal RTs were calculated by manually marking the gap between 
speech at the end of the interviewer’s question and the beginning of the participants’ answer. 
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Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a sound-attenuated room with a monitor and 
webcam. After having the task explained to them they read an information sheet, filled out a 
consent form, and were then fitted with headphones and the DRT. They were told that the 
content of the videos was unknown to the interviewer in order to encourage natural lies where 
the target does not necessarily know they are being lied to. Participants were instructed that 
they could tell lies either by producing a narrative that was completely unrelated to the video 
or take the main themes of the video and change as many details as possible. They were 
instructed that their lies needed to be convincing and plausible, and memorable as they would 
be asked to recall some responses after the task. They were told their responses would be 
checked after the task to determine if they were lying or not.  
The interviewer sat in front of a webcam enabled computer in an adjacent room and 
interacted with the participant through Skype (Skype for Windows 10, Version 8.18.0.6). The 
interviewer could not see the participant’s screen but throughout the experiment the 
participant and interviewer’s faces were visible to each other.  
The participant’s computer presented each video and the DRT ran continuously 
throughout the experiment. Before each of the videos began a cue appeared on the 
participant’s screen instructing them to either lie or tell the truth (e.g., “After the following 
movie, please tell the truth when you reply to the questions.”). At the end of each movie a 
cue appeared (“Now signal to the interviewer that the movie has finished”) with either Truth 
or Lie in bold at screen centre.  
Participants did one practice trial each of the lying and truth conditions before the 
main task began. After each practice trial they were given verbal feedback such as “that level 
of detail is fine”, or, if the response was only one sentence, to “remember to provide as much 
detail as you can”.  There were no further prompts throughout the experiment. Once any 
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participant questions were clarified they were instructed to follow the prompt on the screen 
(“Hold down Ctrl, left arrow and then the space bar to run the next video”, which aimed to 
prevent them skipping ahead) to start the experimental trials. After the one-minute video, the 
prompt to lie/tell the truth returned and remained on the participant’s screen. The interviewer 
then asked: “Please describe as quickly as possible in as much detail as possible, what 
occurred in the video”. Once the answer was completed the interviewer asked: “As quickly as 
possible in as much detail describe the main character”. When the response was brief the 
interviewer used a follow up question, such as “Can you describe one of the characters?” or, 
if they had described the characters in detail in the first response, “Can you describe what 
they were wearing?”. The interviewer then asked the participants to follow the screen 
prompts for the next video.  
The main experiment consisted of thirteen true and thirteen lie trials that were 
randomly ordered, except that after two consecutive lie or truth trials the software always 
switched to the alternative. A rest break occurred after trial fourteen. At the end of the 
experiment participants were asked to recount their answer to the trial that occurred before 
the break and the final trial. The total length of the experiment averaged 75 minutes. 
Results 
The responses were informally scrutinised by the trained interviewer throughout the 
task. Participants gave a variety of responses that contradicted the content of the videos and 
alternated between strategies of simply changing character genders, to constructing wholly 
new narratives. One participant consistently failed to provide deceptive narratives and so 
their data was excluded from further analysis.  
Following the ISO standard (ISO, 2016), all DRT RTs faster than 0.1 secs (1.2% of 
all responses) and slower than 2.5 secs (1.2% of all responses) were considered anticipations 
or omissions and excluded, leaving an average of 822 valid DRT trials per participant. All 
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DRT trials during the practice trials and session break were removed, as were those 
immediately before the onset of each movie (as participants had to hold down several 
buttons, which disabled their ability to respond to the DRT).  
No censoring was performed on the verbal RT data as participants could prepare their 
answer while listening to the question and anticipate when it finished, so very fast responses 
are plausible. Similarly, slow responses are plausible, and they were not overly influential 
because the analysis was performed on a logarithmic scale where verbal RT distribution was 
approximately normal, with the same being true for DRT RT. Most participants had the 
maximum number of valid verbal RTs, 52 (two per trial), with one having 45 and another 50.  
 For all analyses responses were divided into blocks before and after the break in order 
to test for time-on-task effects due to factors like practice and fatigue. Inference was carried 
out using linear mixed-effect models with the R package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2014). RT analysis used a general linear model assuming Gaussian error for 
logarithmically transformed RT data, and DRT omissions analysis used a generalized linear 
mixed model assuming a binomial error model and a probit link function. In all analyses the 
43 participants and 26 movies were included as additive random effects and block and 
veracity (truth vs. lie) were entered as fixed effects. For some DRT analyses a “phase” factor, 
(construction while watching the movie vs. action while providing a narrative response) was 
also a fixed factor. Fixed effects were assessed using a Type II Wald chi-square test as 
implemented by the car package (Fox & Weisberg, 2011).  
Bayesian analyses were carried out with the default prior method of Rouder, Morey, 
Speckman, and Province (2012) using the BayesFactor R package (Morey & Rouder, 2018). 
For RT the same type of general linear model was used as for the frequentist analysis. As 
generalized linear models are not available in BayesFactor, we calculated omission 
probabilities for each trial using Snodgrass and Corwin’s (1998) recommended edge 
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correction, probit transformed them, and applied a general linear model analysis to these 
values. We report 95% confidence intervals in square brackets.  
DRT Performance 
RTs were significantly slower when lying (M = 440, [438-443]) than when telling the 
truth (M = 447, [445-449]) 2 (1) = 31.39, p <.001 indicating higher load in the lie condition 
than the truth condition. RTs were also significantly slower in the narrative phase (M = 528, 
[520-535] than in the construction phase (M = 387, [382-393], 2 (1) = 4441.18, p <.001, 
indicating much higher load for reporting than constructing narratives.  
Figure 1 shows evidence of pervasive fatigue effects, with RT slowing and omissions 
increasing from the first (M = 437, [433-442]) to second half (M =  452, [447-456] of the 
experiment, as indicated by significant block main effects for both RT (Construction: 2(1) = 
42.2, p <.001; Narrative: 2(1) = 7.4, p =.006) and omissions (Construction: 2(1) = 35.8, p 
<.001; Narrative: 2(1) = 123, p <.001). The block effect interacted with veracity in the 
narrative condition for both RT, 2(1) = 11.2, p <.001 and omissions, 2(1) = 5.7, p =.017, 
but analogous interactions for the construction phase did not reach significance, 2(1) = 0.9, p 
=.33, and 2(1) = 1.7, p =.19, respectively. In light of these findings we tested our hypotheses 
separately for each block.  
  In Block 1 RT in the lie condition was significantly slower than for the truth condition 
both in the construction, 2(1) = 6.3, p =.012, and narrative, 2(1) = 38.4, p <.001, phases. In 
contrast, neither effect was significant in Block 2, 2(1) = 0.2, p =.64 and 2(1) = 1.55, p 
=.21, respectively. During the construction phase veracity did not have a significant effect on 
DRT omissions in either Block 1, 2(1) = 0.06, p =.8, or Block 2, 2(1) = 2.05, p =.15. In the 
narrative phase, however, omissions were significantly more common in the lie than truth 
condition, both in Block 1, 2(1) = 27.8, p <.001, and Block 2, 2(1) = 4.6, p =.03.   
NARRATIVE LIES AND COGNITIVE LOAD 10 
 Bayesian tests provided strong evidence not only of some differences, but also of 
equivalence. Block 1 differences for the narrative phase were supported by large Bayes 
Factors (BFs), BF = 3 x 106 for RT, and BF = 1.1 x 105 for omissions. The weaker Block 1 
effect for RT in the construction phase was equivocal in the Bayesian analysis, BF = 0.48, 
whereas the analogous omission effect was associated with clear support for the null, BF = 
0.091 (1/BF = 11). For RT in Block 2 there was strong support for a null effect in the 
construction phase, BF = .028 (1/BF = 35), and the narrative phase, BF = 0.056 (1/BF = 
17.7). For omissions in Block 2 there was positive evidence for the null in the construction 
phase, BF = 0.206 (1/BF = 4.86), and positive evidence for more lie than truth omissions in 
the narrative phase, BF = 5.75.      
Verbal RT 
One participant answered the questions before the interviewer finished speaking, 
giving no discernible break in speech pattern and their data was excluded. The audio 
recording failed for another, leaving data from 41 participants. As shown in Figure 2, 
participants were slower to respond when lying (M = 516, [455-584]) than telling the truth (M 
= 483, [424-550]), in both the first and second halves of the experiment 2 (1) = 7.60, p 
=.006. Neither the block effect nor the interaction of block and veracity were significant. The 
same model performed the best in the Bayesian analysis, but its advantage over an intercept-
only model was equivocal, BF = 1.29. Frequentist simple effect tests found a significant 
effect of veracity in Block 1,  2(1) = 5.6 p =.018, but not Block 2,  2(1) = 2.34, p =.13. 
However, the former effect was equivocal in a Bayesian analysis, BF = 1.01, and the latter 
effect provided positive evidence for the null, BF = 0.2 (1/BF = 5).   
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Discussion 
We employed a widely used and validated dual-task methodology, the DRT (ISO 
2016), to quantify the cognitive load caused by one type of deception that has not previously 
been much studied, narrative lies. For the first half of our experiment both frequentist and 
Bayesian analyses of DRT performance strongly supported the hypothesis that the production 
of narrative lies increases cognitive load, both in the form of slowed responses and response 
omissions. However, this effect was weakened in the second half of the experiment, with the 
elevation in omissions remaining significant and receiving positive but not strong support 
from the Bayesian analysis, whereas the Bayesian analysis strongly supported a null effect on 
RT. These results demonstrate that delivering narrative lies can require more effort than 
making an honest response, particularly when delivering lies with minimal rehearsal.  
The frequentist analysis of DRT RT, but not omissions, supported a higher load for lie 
construction in the first half of the experiment, whereas in the Bayesian analysis the RT 
effect was equivocal, and the null was supported for omissions. For construction in the 
second half of the experiment there was no frequentist support in either measure for a 
veracity effect, and there was support for null effects in the Bayesian analysis. Overall, these 
results suggest that, at least in our paradigm, lie construction causes only a mild initial 
elevation in cognitive load, and that any effect that was present disappeared with time on 
task.  
There are likely several factors involved in the diminished effect over the experiment. 
Firstly, rehearsal impacts the cognitive effort involved in lying (Walczyk et al., 2013). It is 
possible that increasing familiarity with the experiment allowed participants to take 
advantage of the construction phase to rehearse their lies. Second is the role of effort. 
Participants may have produced less complex lies as they became more familiar with the task. 
Reduction in complexity of lies over the task would also be supportive of the model of lying 
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suggested by Information Manipulation Theory 2 (IMT2, McCornack, et al. 2014), that lies 
are only harder when they contain the portrayal of complex information, are based on the 
retrieval of decayed semantic memories, and when there has been no opportunity to rehearse 
the delivery. 
Unfortunately, the nature of narrative lies makes measuring their complexity a 
challenge. According to IMT2, lies differ by their quality, quantity, manner and relevance 
and they are blended in truth (McCornack, et al. 2014). This is particularly true in narrative 
lies, which is a likely reason for the near absence of studies on them in the literature. 
Consistent with IMT2, participants gave a variety of lies, from as little as changing the 
gender of the main character to constructing wholly new narratives. Classifying these 
responses along a continuum from completely true to completely false would be a highly 
subjective endeavour. However, as a proxy for effort we analyzed overall time spent lying. 
On average, participants did not differ significantly between block 1 (505 ms) to block 2 (535 
ms), p = .47, and a Bayes factor of 0.2 indicated positive evidence for no difference. Even so, 
it remains possible that if we had required a homogenously high level of deception, rather 
than allowing participants to lie most comfortably for them, we may have obtained stronger 
effects.  
Further, one aspect of constructing a plausible lie is not producing information the 
interviewer knows to be false. Our paradigm did not require this of participants, making lie 
construction easier than is usually the case. The clear lack of any construction effect during 
the second half of the experiment, and the reduced effect in the production phase, may be due 
to participants realising that they need not worry about the interviewer’s evaluations. 
Clearly, future research should address these limitations before a strong conclusion 
can be made that narrative lie construction produces little or no increase cognitive workload. 
Another interesting avenue for future research is to give participants a longer time to prepare 
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their lies. This could potentially shift the balance of cognitive load onto the construction 
phase and away from the production phase.     
A potential limitation of the DRT, and other dual-task methodologies, is that they may 
affect the primary task. However, the impact of the DRT on driving when it is the primary 
task have been shown to be minimal (Castro, Cooper & Strayer, 2016). The same seems 
likely true of narrative production, which like driving, requires very different responses than 
the DRT. The DRT is also not suitable for the study of lies whose production is very brief, 
such as when giving one-word answers. The study of lying is challenging because of the 
great diversity of ways in which deception can occur, so it is likely that no one approach will 
be generally applicable. Fortunately, at least for complex and lengthy acts of deception – a 
characteristics that Walczyk, Roper, Seemann and Humphrey (2003) noted makes accounting 
for narrative lies a “formidable theoretical challenge” (p.757) – the DRT does seem well 
suited, and so can aid researcher in addressing the challenges presented by this diversity.       
 Our frequentist analysis showed an increase in verbal RT (i.e., the time to initiate a 
response in answer to a question) when lying in the first half of our experiment. However, 
this was not supported by a Bayesian analysis, and the effect disappeared in the second half. 
This finding stands in contrast to the strong effects reported by Suchotzki et al.’s (2017) 
meta-analysis of non-narrative lies, where there was an average effect of 0.115 sec, whereas 
we found an average effect of only 0.023 sec in the first half of the experiment. Our paradigm 
afforded participants an opportunity for some preparation, whereas in the paradigms 
examined by Suchotzki et al. the instruction to lie was provided simultaneously with the 
question. The simple responses required in their paradigms mean the construction of a 
complex lie is not necessary, perhaps suggesting this greater slowing is associated with the 
decision to lie and, possibly, the need to supress the truth. In our paradigm both of these tasks 
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can be accomplished before a response has to be initiated, and in many naturalistic contexts 
even more preparation time can be available.  
A methodological limitation of verbal RT in the narrative context is that it is hard to 
collect many responses. Although we collected more than the minimum recommended by 
Suchotzki et al. (2017), this number was still relatively modest. The DRT afforded many 
more trials and hence far more precise individual measurement, recommending it as a better 
method to investigate cognitive load (see Smith & Little, 2018, on the importance of precise 
individual measurement for reproducibility).  
A further important advantage of dual-task methodologies like the DRT is that they 
provide a concrete grounding for the concept of cognitive load, which can otherwise be 
theoretically empty (Navon, 1984). This grounding may be particularly useful in assessing 
the influential Cognitive-Load Approach to lie detection, which attempts to make involuntary 
signs of lying more evident through manipulations aiming to increase cognitive load (e.g., 
recounting stories backward, engaging in unanticipated questions and tasks and forcing direct 
eye contact during interviews (see Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011). The DRT has the 
potential to provide a rigorous assessment of which methods of inducing cognitive load have 
the strongest effects. Although the voluntary nature of the DRT, like other RT-based 
approaches, likely makes it subject to counter measures, and so unsuitable for direct use in lie 
detection (Sip et al., 2013), we conclude that it does present a promising avenue toward 
refining both our theoretical understanding of deception and the techniques employed to 
make involuntary signs of lying more evident.  
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Figure 1. DRT mean RT (top row) and omission rate (bottom row) when watching the video (Construction, left 
column) and producing a response (Narrative, right column) for true and lie responses during the first (Block 1) 
and second (Block 2) half of the experiment. Means and within-subject standard errors (Morey, 2008) were 
calculated on the logarithmic scale for RT and on the probit for omission probability and the resulting points 
and intervals transformed back to the natural scale for graphing. 
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Figure 2. Mean time to answer questions for true and lie responses during the first (Block 1) and second (Block 
2) half of the experiment. Means and within-subject standard errors (Morey, 2008) were calculated on the 
logarithmic scale for RT and the resulting points and intervals transformed back to the natural scale for 
graphing. 
  
